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ABSTRACT
The economist speaks in terms of free enterprise, 
and of competition* This most pure state of ec­ 
onomic existence, where all economic textbooks 
begin, is a rare occurrence in the real world, 
however. The energy market is a notable example 
of how government involvement has skewed consumer 
chpices. This is as it should be, for we expect 
the public decision ^-making process to involve 
more than just considerations of economy.
This paper will place solar energy in the context 
of a marketplace for energy, and justify the role 
of government in influencing solar energy market 
development and market penetration. It will also 
examine the concept of commercialization, the 
effect of government incentives, and the proper 
timing of government involvement.
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I, BACKGROUND - THE FREE MARKET - FACT OR FICTION?
The economist speaks in terms of free enterprise, 
and of competition. In the absence of market ex­ 
ternalities, such as government involvement1and 
natural monopolies, the marketplace will operate 
of its own momentum so as to perfectly answer the 
questions: What shall be produced? How shall it 
be produced? and For Whom shall it be produced? 2 
Suppliers meet demanders in the marketplace and 
conduct "arms-length" transactions that optimally 
determine the resource utilization, prices, distri­ 
bution, manufacture and wages (the list is far 
from exhaustive) of all goods and services avail­ 
able to consumers at a point in time. In theory, 
the marketplace is a massively complex and ideally 
oiled machine where private decisions are in sum 
equivalent to public good. As another economic 
theorist has offered:
- Every individual endeavors to employ his 
capital so that its produce may be of 
greatest value. He generally neither 
intends to promote the public interest, 
nor knows how much he is promoting it. 
He intends only his own security, only
his own gain. And he is in this led by 
an invisible hand to promote an end which 
was no part of his intention. By pursuing 
his own interest he frequently promotes 
that of society more effectually than 
when he really intends to promote it.
Macro-economics, however, uses the model of per­ 
fect competition only to depart from it. Free 
enterprise is a reference point to be departed 
from in seeking to illuminate some portion of the 
real economic world, where externalities com­ 
monly operate.
The government long ago decided to involve itself 
ir^ the marketplace for energy. Notable examples 
of this include the regulation of utilities and 
the dissolution of the Standard Oil monopoly. For 
better or for worse, it has been a function of 
government since that time to skew consumer choices 
for energy. Certain energy sources have been 
subsidized or otherwise encouraged, and others 
have been restricted or discouraged. Government 
involvement in energy in some form is a foregone 
conclusion, particularly in these times of disturbing 
energy shortages, strong environmental and social 
concerns, and potential embargoes. Only the proper 
nature and level of involvement is at issue.
It is hypothesized that federal incentives for 
energy production result from economic, political, 
and legal pressures to rectify perceived market 
failures. When price signals from the marketplace 
do not coincide with the goals and objectives of 
industry, consumer groups, or public institutions, 
the perception is one of market failure. Using 
perceived market failure as justification, industry 
allocates resources to affect energy policy in 
order to gain greater profits. Consumer groups 
seek lower prices. Research scientists and ad­ 
ministrators of public institutions also affect 
energy policy.
If all the incentives to increase energy produc­ 
tion were attributed to structural deficiencies of 
the industries or to externalities of the proces­ 
ses, an analysis of incentives could be approach­ 
ed totally within an economic framework. If, on 
the other hand, incentives are the result of per­ 
ceived market failure, alternative frameworks 
would result in a greater utilization of federal 
incentives to energy production.
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Consider curve S presented in Figure I as a 
secular supply curve for U.S. energy. The curve 
is secular because it represents all of the energy 
that exists in known forms over time. It repre­ 
sents the range of energy quantitites that would 
be marketed at various prices in the absence of 
government incentives. The shape of the curve is 
primarily determined by the existence and loca­ 
tion of known energy resources and the rate at 
which a stream of technology can be utilized to 
transform the.se resources into power. As more 
of the energy resources are used, the supply be­ 
comes more inelastic. This is so because it costs 
more to dig or drill deeper or to utilize lower 
grade resources.
The price of energy is established at the in­ 
tersection of S and the demand curve for energy,
Q
D . Changes in the demand and the resultant 
effect on the price could be perceived as market 
failure. The result could be pressure from in­ 
dustry, consumers, or public institutions to 
create incentives to increase energy production 
at some historic price. These pressures can be 
viewed from an economic, political, institutional, 
or legal perspective.
Consider curve S/ as an apparent secular supply 
curve for energy. Some of the real costs of 
energy production are borne by the federal govern-^ 
ment through the creation and administration of 
policies, programs, and projects. The effect of 
these incentives is to increase the production 
of energy at a lower price. The cause is the in-" 
elusion of participants whose goals are other than 
the sale and purchase of energy and who are not 
relatively interchangeable with relatively equal 
power. Participants who are less interchangeable 
and whose power is less than buyers and sellers 
operate in the political arena rather than in 
the marketplace. Actions of participants who are 
still less interchangeable and have less power 
can be described from an institutional point of 
view. The legal point of view can be used to 
understand the resulting pressures by participants 
with the least power and the least interchange- 
ability.
Therefore, whereas it is entirely fitting to ask, 
"Could not energy be delivered to end users more 
expeditiously and economically in the absence of 
government interference?", this purist argument 
fails on two major counts:
1) The reality of our economic history is 
already heavily weighted in the opposite direction, 
and
2) There are considerations other than economy 
that must receive attention (i.e. unemployment, 
pollution, quality of life), and government is 
the only entity in our society fully responsible 
for addressing them and capable of integrating 
both economic and non-economic influences into 
policy decisions and legislation. Political ec­ 
onomy is inclusive of the political, institutional, 
and legal frameworks, and it is the concept of 
importance in the marketplace for energy. "Net
economic welfare" is another term for expressing 
this concept. How does solar energy fit into 
this context?
II. SOLAR ENERGY - IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST?
As one of the energy options available to con­ 
sumers, businessmen, and policy makers alike, 
solar energy for heating and cooling of build­ 
ings (SHAG) is a prime candidate for government 
incentives to encourage its greater utilization. 
Among other advantages, it offers 1) the 
opportunity to reduce the use of nuclear and 
fossil fuels, 2) a net reduction of pollution 
over power produced by more conventional means,
3) a renewable alternative to finite fuel sources,
4) a decentralized versus centralized quality 
affording greater citizen control than our pre­ 
sent energy delivery system, and 5) the promise 
of cost competitiveness in many areas of the 
country today. Clearly, economics is not the 
whole story of solar energy.
However, most consumers will not incorporate the 
full range of solar energy benefits into their 
decision process. They will include first costs 
and a limited range of other variables depending 
on the application (residential, commercial, in­ 
dustrial). In all applications, reasons 1-3 above 
would likely be outside the consumer decision 
process; it remains for government to correct for 
this market failure.
In recent years, the working of our political 
economy has spawned substantial solar legislation 
at all levels of government. As the federal level 
alone, these laws have encompassed and mandated 
research and development, demonstration projects, 
standards development, information dissemination, 
and other activties broadly construed as com­ 
mercialization (see section III). The "feds" 
are engaged in actively promoting a consumer tech­ 
nology. How far should the government go?
In order to conceptualize the possible government 
role in solar energy, it is useful to describe 
the solar marketplace as a "technology delivery 
system" (TDS). By this is meant a model of all 
the potential influencers of solar market status 
from scientists to manufacturers to final con­ 
sumers. Figure 2 depicts such a model.
The TDS is the context into which all government 
policies affecting solar energy must fit. It is a 
complex environment that lends itself to incen­ 
tives of both an economic and non-quantifiable 
nature. Examples of the former include tax 
credits, (property, sales, income) low interest 
loans and grants, while the latter ecompasses 
standards, consumer information and protection, 
and building codes, all of which set the "rules of 
the game." Whatever incentive is chosen, the 
question to answer is not only what incentive is 
appropriate, but also what level of incentive is 
advisable, and what TDS member(s) should be sti­ 
mulated if greater use of solar energy is the 
objective? Incentives could be devised for every
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9TDS member. Appendix i and Table II n analyze one- 
potential incentive in depth.
Lastly, there is a danger that government involve­ 
ment will become prolonged beyond its useful life. 
Our tax system in particular is riddled with such 
anachronisms. An additional question then is when 
does the government get out of the business of 
incentives and allow a return to normal market 
forces. That is, can the government measure 
when there is a self-sustaining solar industry so 
it can cease at least its economic measures., 1^ 
The last section of this paper suggests a pos­ 
sible measure to use as indicator of program 
utility. When can SHAG systems be officially con­ 
sidered "commercialized"?
III. COMMERCIALIZATION
Having accepted some measure of government involve­ 
ment in SHAC, we are left with four fundamental 
questions:
1) What incentives to use?
2) What level of incentive to use?
3) What TDS member to "incentivize?"
4) When are solar systems commercialized?
Only by being able to satisfactorily answer these 
questions can the government devise coherent 
programs that help create the conditions in which 
a private market for SHAC systems can grow and 
flourish.
For the purpose of this paper f "Commercialization" 
is defined as the entire range of possible govern­ 
ment activities in support of the development of 
a viable solar marketplace. This definition 
includes demonstration projects, research and 
development, standards development, tax credits, 
and all programs that have as their objective 
the hastening of SHAC systems to the marketplace. 
All TDS members are potential targets of government 
commercialization efforts.
It is not only important that commercialization 
activities be properly selected, but also that 
they be properly phased. For example, it would 
be inappropriate to grant low interest loans to 
a technical concept that was still on the drawing 
board. In theory, commercialization activities 
will flow on a continuum from left to right on 
Figure 2, but in practice, many programs will 
proceed concurrently.
Some commercialization activities are more critical 
at one time than at another. Clearly, the choice 
between provisions for SHAC grants, tax subsidies, 
low interest loans, accelerated depreciation and 
the like becomes academic if the hardware is 
unrealiable or unavailable. It is only when 
the seed of a marketplace exists that "end use" 
(final consumer) incentives become salient, whereas 
manufacturing incentives may continue for the 
lifetime of government commerqialization activities. 
If a cell in Figure 2 is empty (a null set),
incentives to that TDS "member" are inappropriate . 
End use incentives, though potentially shorter in 
duration, are at the cutting edge of public policy, 
are the most politically visible, and enter into 
consideration just at the time when the SHAC market 
is ready to expand vigorously or to fizzle. 
Table 1 lists a range of possible end use economic 
incentives .
Lastly, the choice of incentive will depend on 
the climatological, alternative energy, financial, 
legal, institutional and attitudinal environments 
in which SHAC systems exist. Commercialization 
at this level of specificity includes distinctly 
regional, state, and local geographical areas and 
organizations. For each subset of the TDS, incen­ 
tives must be tailored to these environments.
In practice, the federal government has developed 
consumer decision models that predict consumer 
purchase reactions based on a set of economic 
incentives in a given market environment (see 
Appendix 1). Such tools must continue to be 
refined as our understanding of energy behavior 
grows. Again, economics is not the whole story.
TABLE 1 
END USE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
Interest Subsidy 
Tax Credit 
Tax Deduction 
Rapid Amortization 
Property Tax Credit 
Sales Tax Credit 
Guaranteed Loan
Grants
Insurance and Reinsurance
Equity Investments
Utility Incentives
Tax on Alternative Fuels
Government Procurement
Source: Analysis of Policy Options for Accelerat­ 
ing Commercialization of Solar Heating and Cooling 
Systems, Bezdek, Roseraan, et al, Behavioral Studies 
Group, The George Washington University, Washington, 
D.C., April 1977, pp 102 and 108.
These models go to the heart of the government's 
dilemma in constructing an effective commercializa­ 
tion package. What incentives will have what 
impact? What magnitude of incentive will "do the 
trick"? The model used in appendix 1 based its 
predictions on life cycle costs, annual savings, 
and first costs, but it is only informed speculation, 
that allows us to pick out these few key criteria 
while the others recede into the periphery. 
Careful survey, analysis, and actual market experi­ 
ence of TDS members allow model builders to con­ 
tribute to the design of accurate models and 
responsible policies.
Two incentive philosophies that emerge from this 
debate include "demand-pull" and "supply push." 
The former involves lowering the relative cost or 
risk of solar systems to end users, and the latter 
involves the lowering of cost or risk to inter­ 
mediate TDS members. 2 The first accelerates 
consumer desire for the technology, the second 
makes that technology more available. The 
mechanisms in table 1 are all demand-pull incentives; 
a demonstration program would be an example of 
supply push. The decision model will predict which 
philosophical strategy, or mix of strategies, will
3-3
generate the most market penetration for each 
government dollar invested.
However, model predictions are devoid of meaning 
in a situation where clearly perceived and accepted 
goals have not been set. Only when the evaluation 
criteria are agreed upon can the model's numbers 
assume any qualitative value. Is 2.5 million solar 
homes enough by 1985? Are we trying to install 
solar collectors or save energy? How many barrels 
of oil do we wish to displace in year X? Only 
within the context of goals do a model's predic­ 
tions take on meaning. Success can only be 
measured if the yardstick for measuring it is 
accepted beforehand by government policy makers.
The first three questions posed at the outset of 
this section have been implicitly answered in the 
foregoing discussion of models and goals, and may 
be summed up in the phrase "divide and calibrate." 
After selecting the objective(s) divide the 
market into its components (TDS members) and 
calibrate their responses to given levels of given 
incentives in given environments. Aggregate 
these to the local, regional, or national level 
as appropriate, and compare to the original 
evaluation criteria.
How does one know when SHAC systems are commercial­ 
ized? The following measure is herein proposed: 
Suppose the government goal is to equalize the 
life cycle costs of competing systems. Use the 
traditional logit model of market penetration and 
closely monitor systems costs and market sales 
(Figure 3) to pinpoint when the curves inflection 
point is or will be reached or slightly passed. 
This is the second triangle in Figure 3. Consis­ 
tent with our objective, positive government 
incentives should be winding down, by this point, 
possibly leaving only regulatory and consumer 
protection programs in place to control abuses.
This is a diffcult mark to hit precisely. In 
practice, incentives can be designed to continue 
until one is certain that the inflection point has 
been passed. Then, the government can pull out, 
knowing that SHAC systems can now compete on their 
own merits.
Other goals such as equalizing first costs with 
competing systems would use other measures to 
determine a program's effectiveness. Whatever the 
goal, policy decisions must only be made in the 
context of detailed knowledge of the TDS and 
its members likely reaction to cost, risk, and 
other environmental elements.
APPENDIX I*
INTRODUCTION
Much debate has recently occurred in the U. S. 
concerning the proper type and level of economic 
incentives to encourage the use of solar energy. 
Prior to the National Energy Plan (NEP) tax credits 
for homeowners, investment tax credits for busi­ 
nesses, low interest loans and guaranteed loans 
and a range of other possible incentives were dis­ 
cussed to encourage the use of solar energy. Pres­ 
ident Carter's NEP, however, has narrowed this 
debate focusing on the homeowner tax credit as the 
major device for promoting the use of solar energy. 
This example provides an analysis of the following 
incentive option:
Incentive I:
See Table
METHODOLOGY
Purchaser Tax Credit of 30% on the 
First $1,500 of System Cost, 20% on 
Next $8,500, up to a Maximum of 
$2,150 Tax Credit, Effective 1977- 
1984.
II for market penetration results.
This measure has the aesthetic and numerical appeal 
of occuring approximately at the point that life 
cycle costs for the conventional energy system 
with and without SHAC systems are equivalent.
As has been pointed out, the government has a long 
history of involvement in the delivery of energy 
to end users. In so doing, the initial and oper­ 
ating cost of the conventional systems have been 
effectively lowered. The inflection point in 
figure 3 represents that point at which SHAC 
systems have attained par lifetime value with 
fossil and nuclear energy delivery techniques. 
Incentives continued beyond this point tend to 
supplant private mechanisms and capital that are 
drawn out as soon as full lifetime competitiveness 
is achieved.
A modified version of the MITRE/METREK Solar 
Heating and Cooling Market Penetration Model was 
utilized. This model disaggregates the U. S. into 
16 climatic regions. In this analysis, simulations 
were run for the seven of the 16 regions containing 
approximately 70% of the existing and the antici­ 
pated new buildings through 1985. The results were 
then scaled accordingly to derive comprehensive 
national estimates. The nine building types con­ 
tained in the model were aggregated here to two 
types: residential and commercial. It was assumed 
that inflation would proceed at an annual rate of 
5%, that fuel prices would increase at an annual 
rate of 7%, and that no incremental property taxes 
would be assessed on the SHAC systems.
System costs varied by building type (residential, 
commercial), by system type, and by region. The 
following average costs were used. Residential 
water heating systems in 1977 cost $17.40 per 
square foot, plus a fixed cost of $397. Residen­ 
tial combined water and space heating systems cost 
$29.31 per square foot plus a fixed cost which is 
region dependent. Commercial water and space
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\heating systems in 1977 cost $22,61 per square foot 
plus a fixed cost of $13,615. Commercial water and 
space heating systems cost $27.64 per square foot 
plus a fixed cost that is region dependent. A 
moderate "learning curve" effect was incorporated 
into the analysis which gradually reduced system 
costs as total production increased.
In this analysis, the total costs for a solar hot 
water and a solar heating and hot watej: system have 
been divided into two categories: Those that will 
be subject to cost decreases due to experience, 
and those which will not decrease. System costs 
.that are subject to experience include the col3.ec- 
tor and its hardware, control systems, and some 
design, installation, and markup charges. Those 
costs not subject to experience include pumps/ heat 
exchangers, plumbing material, auxiliary units, 
tanks, etc. The experience relateci costs represent 
approximately 25% of the total system costs.
For each region in each year, life cycle cost 
ratios (LCR) are computed. This is the ratio of 
the life cycle cost of the solar system to the life 
cycle cost of the qonventional (electric) system 
and it is the driving parameter of the model. Sep­ 
arate ratios are computed for residential water 
heating systems, residential water and space heat*- 
ing systems, commercial water heating systems, and 
commercial water and space heating systems. The 
new construction market is considered separately 
from the retrofit construction market. For each 
system type, the potential new construction market 
is the number of new buildings constructed sqaled 
by an adjustment factor. The retrofit construc­ 
tion market is the existing number of electric 
systems, adjusted by a suitability factor.
MARKET SHARE COMPUTATION
Once the model produces estimates of the life cycle 
costs for conventional and solar installations, 
there remains the task of converting the two cost 
estimates into market penetration estimates for 
solar energy. Following a long line of researchers, 
we shall adopt the logit model developed by 
MacFadden, and first applied in the fuel choice 
literature by Jaskow and Baughman. 1 The specific 
mathematical form is due to Case.
ft!?1
Where: Dg = solar sales
D * conventional sales
C'.DS/DS+ DC = solar market penetration) 
P = price of solar 
PC = price of conventional 
«<,m = parameters
In this analysis, the price of conventional and 
solar are calculated on a life-cycle basis, using 
a discount rate of 9%. Since the logit model has 
two parameters, two data points are needed to fit 
the curves. The first point is taken from 1976 
estimated 1.9% market penetration by solar - 5000 
solar systems installed on a target housing popula- 
tion of 30,000, our estimate of the number of resi­ 
dential and commercial structures built in 1976 that 
were (a) all electric; (b) oriented to the sun, 
plus the retrofit target population, which were 
(a) all electric; (b) oriented to the sun, and (c) 
had more than 20 years useful life remaining. The 
second point on the surve is based upon an estimate 
that solar hot water heating will achieve 50% market 
penetration when it has a four-fold life cycle cost 
advantage over conventional systems. This is a 
conservative assumption, since one might expect 
50% market penetration when the two prices are 
approximately equal. Our choice of the much more 
conservative number is based upon the uncertainty 
associated with future solar maintenance and 
operating costs.
*This example of the use of a model based upon 
economic decision criteria has been taken from 
"Costs and Impacts of Financial Incentives for 
Solar Energy Systems" by Dr. Roger H. Bezdek and 
Elliot J. Roseman presented at the International
Solar Energy Society (ISES) conference held in
— New Delhi, India, January 16-21, 1978.
Some would say government "intervention" or 
"intrusion", thus begging the question of its 
propriety.
Paul A. Samuelson, Economics, 9th edition, McGraw 
Hill Book Company, New York, 1978, p.23
fbid, p, 41, Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations
In a soon-to-be-release report, Battelle North­ 
west Laboratories documents the numerical incen­ 
tives that government has provided to the fuels 
commonly in use today-nuclear, coal, oil, natural
. gas, and hydroelectric power. In each case, the 
aggregate amount is in the billions of dollars. 
This capital has supplemented private capital to 
create new energy realities. For example, the 
commercial nuclear industry would not be where 
it is today without the active weapons program 
of the 1940's and 50's, nor would the oil in­ 
dustry have reached its current magnitude without 
the depletion allowance. Some incentives, such 
as the Price-Anderson Act, (limiting nuclear 
plant liability in the event of accidents) are non- 
quantifiable but tangible. See An Analysis of _ 
Federal Incentives Used to Stimulate Energy 
Production, Battelle Pacific Northwest Labo^ 
ratories, September, 1977
4 "Commercialization" is the term currently employed
to describe the range of activities that govern­ 
ment at all levels can undertake to bring about 
a market reality. Section III expands on this 
concept.
Samuelson, p. 4
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See for example, An Analysis of the Current 
Economic Feasibility of Solar Water and Space 
Heating, U.S. Department of Energy, Division of 
Solar Applications, January, 1978, DOE/CS-0023 .
To name a few, P.L. 93-473, "Solar Energy Research 
Development and Demonstration Act of 1974" 
P.L. 93-438,"Energy Reorganization Act of 1974" 
P.L. 93-409, "Solar Heating and Cooling Demon­ 
stration Act of 1974."
Also see, State Solar Legislation, published 
by the National Solar Heating and Cooling Infor - 
mation Center in Philadelphia.
This chart may be found in Solar Energy Incentives 
Analysis: Psycho-Economic Factors Affecting the 
Decision Making of Consumers and the Technology 
Delivery System, U. S. Department of Energy, 
Division of Solar Applications, January, 1978, 
HCP/M2534/01, p.5
8.A seminal article on the topic is by Dr. Arthur 
Ezra, "Technology Utiliztion: Incentives and 
Solar Energy", February 28, 1975,Science magazine. 
9 Solar Energy Incentives Analysis, pp. 34-39
Philosophically, one can argue that the govern­ 
ment can not do 'marketing" competently and that 
it should stick solely to the area of preventing 
abuses (i.e. minimum performance levels and anti­ 
trust enforcement). This ignores, however, the 
urgency of our energy situation — the government 
must supplant private funds in order to shorten 
the lead time on product development through 
positive catalysts as well as protective measures. 
For further elaboration, see Government Support 
for the Commercialization of New Energy Technolo­ 
gies, MIT Energy Laboratory Report No. MIT-EL 
76-009 (ERDA Contract E(49-18 2295), November, 
1976.
-federal and state building i solar authorities rates, availability
.^;-f^- DOE>5t4l8hOM5ln9mhorU1es) .E!j£i 
Figure 2
Market Share - Logit Specification
11
12
See Solar Energy Incentives Analysis (Reference 
8) for an elaboration on the behavioral compo­ 
nent of the energy marketplace
'An indirect supply push would involve the perceiv­ 
ed or actual raising of prices or risk for al­ 
ternatives to solar (nuclear, oil, gas).
Market Pentration of Solar Heating and Cooling 
Systems," Dr. Roger Bezdek and Dr. Arthur Ezra, 
International Solar Energy Society World Conference 
proceedings, Orlando, Florida, June 6-9, 1977, pi.
Figure 3
1. Total (eumulal
J. linerqy Impacts in the year 19H5:
The Real and Appare
Figure 1 Tabled
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